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with respect to industrial products1 
1. There has been an unprecedented expansion of trade between the European Union 
(EU) and the Central and East European countries (CEECs) in the years following 
the collapse of the CMEA trade bloc and subsequent trade liberalisation undertaken 
by the EU. Community imports from the CEECs increased by 56% in value terms be-
tween 1989 and 1992, and exports by 87%. The rise in imports from CEECs has been 
especially pronounced since the transition to a market economy commenced, with 
annual growth rates of 12% between 1987 and 1989 compared with an annual aver-
age growth of 23% from 1990 to 1992. 
2. Compared with the evolution of our trade with other trading partners, the change 
in the CEECs' export performance is remarkable: from 1987 to 1989, EC imports 
from the CEECs grew by 4 percentage points p.a. less than total extra-EU imports; 
since then, they have outperformed the growth in average extra-EU imports by an 
average of 13 percentage points, and by nearly 20 percentage points in both 1991 
and 1992. In brief, the CEECs switched from being an under performer in the pre-
transition period, to the ranks of the most dynamic trade partners. 
3. Coinciding with this very rapid expansion in imports from the CEECs has been a fun 
damental and radical trade liberalisation on the part the EU. This process culmi-
nated in the signing of Europe Agreements (EAs) which inter alia aim to establish (bi-
lateral) free trade areas in ten years. Trade is the economic and political cornerstone 
of the transition process, and a prerequisite stepping stone for ultimate accession to 
the EU. Pending the ratification of the EAs by all national legislatures, the trade pro-
visions are being implemented via the operation of interim Europe Agreements (IAs). 
1 This supplement is largely based on papers which shall appear shortly in a volume ' The economic interpé-
nétration between the EU and Eastern Europe' in the European Economy series. The supplement has been 
prepared in collaboration with the Directorate General for External Economic Relations. 
4. Overall, the Europe Agreements constitute a very sub-
stantial trade liberalisation package, the scale and 
pace of which is without precedent in the EU. Over fifty 
percent of CEECs trade achieved entry into the EU free 
of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on the day of 
entry into force of the IAs. The main exceptions to im-
mediate free trade concerned sensitive products, ECSC 
products, textiles and clothing. However, even in these 
sectors, immediate liberalisation was substantial and 
accelerates very rapidly. Some 75% of industrial im-
ports from Hungary will be free of tariffs and quantita-
tive restrictions by the end of 1994, with equivalent fig-
ures of 77% for the Czech and Slovak Republics and 
69% for Poland. With a delay of one year, similar condi-
tions will prevail for 65% of imports from Bulgaria and 
for 56% of imports from Romania. 
5. EU recourse to anti-dumping provisions aginst the 
CEECs has been very limited since the transition pro-
cess began, with only two cases being initiated both in 
1992 and 1993. The Europe Agreements provide for the 
CEECs to be treated in exactly the same manneras oth-
er industrialised countries, a major improvement 
compared with the special provisions previously ap-
plied to state trading economies. Anti-dumping mea-
sures currently in force affect a marginal percentage of 
total imports from CEECs (on average only 0.3% of to-
tal EU imports from the CEECs in 1993), and are con-
centrated across a very narrow range of tariff classifi-
cations, mostly basic chemical and steel products. 
Nonetheless, the indirect and implicit costs of anti-
dumping actions should not be ignored, which inter 
alia, can discourage foreign direct investment. 
six Europe Agreements (EAs) between 1991 and 1993,1 
which will establish a (bi-lateral) free trade area for non-
agricultural products within ten years.2 As made clear by 
the declaration of the EU Heads of State and Government 
following their meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993, the 
ultimate goal of the EAs is the accession of the CEECs to 
the European Union. 
This supplement considers the extent to which the trade 
liberalisation provided by the EU in the EA's supports the 
transition process. A review of trade flows since 1989 con-
firms that there has been a massive expansion of EU-CEEC 
trade which coincides with EU trade liberalisation. The 
CEECs have in the space of five years jumped from a situ-
ation of having a declining share in extra EU imports to the 
ranks of the most dynamic trade partners. Growth rates for 
the value of imports from the CEECs reached over 20% in 
1992, with domestic supply side conditions in the CEECs, 
rather than remaining EU trade barriers, apparently acting 
as the constraining factor. 
Declaration on enlargement of the EU Heads of 
State and Government at the Copenhagen Coun-
cil of June 21-22,1993 
'The European Council today agreed that the associated 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire 
shall become members of the European Union. Accession 
will take place as soon as an associated country is able to 
assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the 
economic and political conditions required. ' 
INTRODUCTION 
For the countries of Central and Eastern European 
(CEECs), trade with industrialised nations is the economic 
and political cornerstone of the transition process. Having 
emerged as the dominant trade partner for the CEECs, the 
EU has a particularly important role to play in this regard. 
From an economic perspective, trade is imperative for sev-
eral reasons — as an outlet for goods and services hitherto 
traded with the former command economies, as a source of 
hard currency earnings, to encourage foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), and finally to introduce competitive forces 
into previously centrally planned markets. Politically, 
trade with western economies signifies the process of re-
newed integration with the industrialised democracies, and 
is a necessary stepping stone towards accession to the EU. 
The EU has sought to support the transition process 
through trade, by undertaking a fundamental reorganisa-
tion of market access conditions for the CEECs. Previously 
CEECs had fallen under a special (and more restrictive) 
trade regime which is applied to state trading economies. 
Trade liberalisation by the EU culminated in the signing of 
In order to fully assess the link between trade performance 
and trade liberalisation, this supplement begins by examin-
ing the recent evolution of trade between the EU and the 
CEECs, with the analysis divided into pre and post-transi-
tion phases. Attention is paid the sectoral breakdown of im-
ports from the CEECs with a view to discerning a pattern 
of specialisation and comparative advantage. Subsequent-
ly, section 2 reviews the market access conditions provided 
by the EU as set out in the EAs. Special consideration is 
given to sectors where the EU did not undertake full libera-
lisation immediately (e.g. sensitive sectors such as textiles 
etc.). Finally, section 4 reviews EU recourse to contingent 
protection, especially anti-dumping actions, and considers 
whether they are having any significant negative impact on 
trade. 
1 see table 16 in annex 
2 Some provisions contained in the EA's fall within the exclusive 
competence of Member States, and can therefore only enter into 
force following their ratification by all EU andCEEC national leg-
islatures. In the intervening period, so-called interim Europe 
Agreements (IAs) are being applied which essentially contain the 
trade and some trade-related aspects of the full Europe Agree-
ments. This is possible since trade policy lies within the compe-
tence of the EU. 
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1. TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS 
CEECS TRADE WITH THE EU 
OF 
1.1. Rapid growth since transition began1 
There has been a massive expansion of EC-CEEC trade in the 
years following the collapse of the CMEA trade bloc and 
subsequent trade liberalisation undertaken by the EU. As 
shown in table 1, Community imports from the CEECs in-
creased by 56% in value terms between 1989 and 1992, and 
exports increased by 87%. The increase in imports from 
CEECs has been especially pronounced since the transition 
to a market economy commenced, with annual growth rates 
of 12% between 1987 and 1989 compared with an annual av-
erage growth of 23% from 1990 to 1992. This performance 
is all the more remarkable given that it occurred during a 
period of depressed demand in the EU, and falling growth 
rates of trade throughout industrialised economies. 
The favourable performance of the CEECs contrasts with 
that of other EU trade partners over the same period, most 
of whom saw a decline in the annual average rate of growth 
of EU imports. This point is clearly illustrated in graph 1. 
In relative terms, the change in the CEECs' export per-
formance is remarkable : from 1987 to 1989, EU imports 
from the CEECs grew by 4 percentage points p.a. less than 
total extra-EU imports; since then, they have outperformed 
the growth in average extra-EU imports by 13 percentage 
points, and by nearly 20 percentage points in both 1991 and 
1992. This basic pattern of a relatively weak performance 
prior to transition, followed by sharp growth after 1989, is 
common to all five countries except Romania, and even 
here imports recorded above-average growth in 1992. In 
brief, the CEECs switched from being an under performer 
in the pre-transition period, to the ranks of most dynamic 
trade partners. 
In contrast, the CEECs are heavily dependent on EU markets 
(see table 2), and this dependence has been growing very 
For practical reasons, the scope of the study is limited to manufac-
tured products (defined as NACE 2-4) representing some 80% of 
total EC-CEEC trade. Community trade statistics are used with 
di saggregated trade flows do wn to the 107 industrial sectors of the 
NACE 3 digit level. It reviews the evolution, characteristics and 
sectoral breakdown of trade flows, particularly EU imports from 
CEECs in two sub-periods, 1987-89 the pre-transition phase, and 
1990-92 the transition phase proper. 
quickly since 1989. In 1989, the EU accounted for some 22% 
of total exports from the CEECs, ranging from 6% in Bulga-
ria to 30% in Poland. By 1992, this share had jumped to 48%, 
with the share of Bulgarian exports undergoing a fivefold in-
crease to 30% and that of Poland to 56%. A corresponding 
increase was recorded in the sourcing of CEECs imports from 
the EU. On average, 19% of total CEECs imports in 1988 
came from the EU, and by 1992 this figure had risen to 44%. 
TABLE 1 : EC-CEEC trade in manufactured goods 
1987 to 1992 (NACE 2-4) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 avg 87-89 
avg 
90-92 
1.1 EU imports (bn ECU) 
CEEC-5 
Poland 
ex-CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
7.28 
2.05 
1.78 
1.64 
1.45 
0.35 
1.2 EU exports (bn 
CEEC-5 
Poland 
ex-CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
8.02 
2.03 
1.90 
2.16 
0.59 
1.33 
8.22 
2.55 
1.95 
1.82 
1.55 
0.35 
Ecu) 
8.41 
2.46 
1.97 
2.12 
0.56 
1.30 
9.30 
2.84 
2.23 
2.18 
1.65 
0.40 
10.08 
3.30 
2.14 
2.67 
0.64 
1.32 
10.52 
3.96 
2.40 
2.55 
1.17 
0.44 
10.52 
3.72 
2.34 
2.62 
1.02 
0.82 
13.60 
4.97 
3.68 
3.14 
1.21 
0.60 
15.21 
6.66 
3.43 
3.14 
1.09 
0.89 
16.74 
5.98 
5.10 
3.55 
1.33 
0.76 
18.87 
6.97 
5.63 
3.75 
1.56 
0.98 
8.27 
2.48 
1.99 
1.88 
1.55 
0.37 
8.84 
2.60 
2.00 
2.32 
0.60 
1.32 
13.62 
4.97 
3.73 
3.08 
1.24 
0.60 
14.87 
5.78 
3.80 
3.17 
1.22 
0.90 
1.3 EU trade balance (bn Ecu) 
PECO-5 
Poland 
ex-CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
0.74 
-0.02 
0.12 
0.52 
-0.86 
0.98 
0.19 
-0.09 
0.02 
0.31 
-1.00 
0.95 
1.4 Percentage growth rate 
CEEC-5 
Poland 
ex-CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
5 
21 
4 
-2 
-5 
-2 
1.5 Percentage growth rate 
CEEC-5 
Poland 
ex-CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
13 
24 
9 
10 
7 
1 
0.78 
0.46 
-0.09 
0.49 
-1.01 
0.93 
-0.00 
-0.25 
-0.06 
0.08 
-0.15 
0.38 
1.61 
1.69 
-0.25 
-0.00 
-0.12 
0.30 
2.14 
0.98 
0.53 
0.19 
0.22 
0.30 
in the value of EU imports 
20 
34 
9 
26 
15 
2 
4 
13 
9 
-2 
59 
-38 
45 
79 
46 
20 
7 
9 
24 
5 
64 
19 
43 
9 
in the value of EU exports 
13 
11 
14 
20 
6 
14 
13 
39 
8 
17 
-29 
11 
29 
26 
53 
23 
3 
36 
23 
20 
39 
13 
10 
27 
0.57 
0.12 
0.02 
0.44 
-0.96 
0.22 
12 
27 
6 
II 
4 
0 
13 
18 
12 
15 
7 
7 
1.25 
0.81 
0.07 
0.09 
-0.02 
0.95 
23 
28 
38 
12 
34 
-10 
22 
28 
32 
18 
-7 
24 
Source : EUROSTAT (Comext). 
TABLE 2 : Percentage of total CEECs trade accounted for by EU 
Exports Imports 
Bulgaria* 
CSFR** 
Hungary 
Poland*** 
Romania 
TOTAL**** 
I9SS 
5.8 
24.2 
22.5 
30.3 
24.0 
22.5 
1989 
6.7 
25.7 
24.7 
32.1 
26.7 
24.5 
1990 
10.4 
32.0 
34.2 
46.8 
31.4 
33.5 
1991 
15.7 
40.7 
47.6 
55.6 
34.2 
44.6 
1992 
30.8 
49.5 
49.5 
55.6 
32.5 
48.2 
1988 
16.7 
17.7 
25.2 
27.2 
6.2 
19.2 
1989 
16.5 
17.8 
28.5 
33.8 
6.1 
20.8 
1990 
14.8 
32.1 
31.5 
42.5 
19.6 
27.8 
1991 
20.7 
34.3 
40.4 
49.9 
27.4 
39.5 
1992 
32.6 
42.0 
42.4 
53.1 
37.5 
44.7 
* Basic data comes from Planecon except for flows with the EC, Eastern Europe includes Yugoslavia 
** Import data from national customs statistics in crowns converted into dollars at current exchange rates 
*** Note: the total includes Albania 
**** The various sources are not compatible between each other. Totals for the region and country trade balances are given for illustrative purposes only. 
Source : United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, 1993 
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GRAPH 1 : Average annual growth rates for extra-EU 
imports 
1987-1989 
China 
ynamic S.E. Asia 
EFTA 
Rest OECD 
Med. basin 
Rest of the world 
Extra EC 
CEEC5 
10 20 
percent 
1990-1992 
30 40 
Source : European Commission. 
Although these growth rates are extremely high in absolute 
terms, the CEECs nonetheless remain relatively small 
trade partners of the EU, having increased their share in 
extra-EC imports from 2.8% to a still modest level of 3.3% 
between 1987 and 1992 (to 3.7% for industrial products). 
In terms of market share in the EU, industrial imports from 
the CEECs supplied an average of 0.4% of Community do-
mestic demand over the period 1987-1989, which rose to 
0.5% on average for the period 1990-1992, i.e. a gain of 
25% or 0.1 percentage points. 
1.2. The export base of the CEECs in the EU : 
sector concentration and specialisation 
A feature of imports from the CEECs in the EU is that they 
are concentrated across a narrow range of industrial prod-
ucts, indicating a certain degree of dependence. This is evi-
dent from table 3 listing the share of the five largest sectors 
(NACE 2 digit) in total imports from the CEECs. Romania 
exhibits the greatest degree of concentration, 75% in 1992 
and the Czech and Slovak Republics the greatest degree of 
diversity, 48.7%. On average, the five largest sectors ac-
counted for 63% of total imports for all the CEECs in 1987, 
with some indication of diversification by 1992 when this 
figure had fallen by seven percentage points to 56%. None-
theless, the overriding picture is one of relative stability 
bearing in mind the major alteration in trade regime and 
rapid growth rates. 
The trend of slight diversification in the context of overall 
stability is also evident when one examines data on specia-
lisation indices in table 4. Specialisation indicators reflect 
whether CEECs are above average suppliers of a given 
product to the Community market. The index used below 
points to specialisation in a given product if the share of 
that product in CEECs' industrial exports to the Commun-
ity is higher than the weight of that product in total extra-
EU imports of industrial products. 
Of 107 sectors at the NACE 3 digit level, some 40% benefit 
from a specialisation which is above average. As with the 
data on import concentration, the CSFR has the most div-
ersified import structure and Romania the least. The 
number of sectors where specialisation occurs increased for 
all CEECs with the exception of Romania, although the 
scale of the changes appear modest in the context of the 
transition process. 
TABLE 3 Share in total imports to the EU of the five most important imports by sector from the CEECs, 1987 and 1992 (NACE 2 digit) 
Bulgaria 
Product 
Prod. 
process 
metals 
Chemical 
industry 
Food, 
drink, 
tobacco 
Footwear, 
clothing 
Textiles 
TOTAL 
1987 
20.9 
16.7 
12.1 
9.9 
8.3 
67.9 
1992 
15.3 
11.2 
9.7 
22.6 
8.6 
67.4 
ex-CSFR 
Product 
Prod. 
process 
metals 
Chemical 
industry 
Timber, 
wooden 
fum. 
Footwear, 
clothing 
Mechanical 
engineering 
also Textiles 
Mfg. 
non-metal 
mineral 
TOTAL (5*) 
1987 
12.8 
12.7 
10.5 
8.0 
7.5 
7.5 
7.1 
51.5 
1992 
13.7 
9.6 
6.7 
9.5 
7.9 
5.8 
8.0 
48.7 
Hungary 
Product 
Food, drink, 
tobacco 
Footwear, 
clothing 
Chemical 
industry 
Prod, 
process m 
Electrical 
engineering 
Mechanical 
engineering 
TOTAL (5*) 
1987 
20.7 
17.2 
12.5 
9.9 
7.1 
5.7 
67.4 
1992 
1525 
17.8 
10.8 
6.5 
11.1 
7.3 
61.7 
Poland 
Product 
Food, 
drink, 
tobacco 
Footwear, 
clothing 
Prod. 
process 
metals 
Chemical 
industry 
Timber, 
wooden 
firm. 
TOTAL 
1987 
1725 
14.9 
14.6 
11.6 
9.6 
68.2 
1992 
1025 
17.0 
15.9 
8.5 
11.6 
63.5 
Romania 
Product 
Timber, 
wooden 
furn. 
Footwear, 
clothing 
Prod. 
process 
metals 
Textiles 
Chemical 
industry 
TOTAL 
1987 
23.4 
22.1 
9.7 
9.2 
8.0 
72.4 
1992 
18.9 
33.5 
9.0 
8.3 
5.9 
75.6 
CEECs 
Product 
Footwear, 
clothing 
Prod. 
process 
metals 
Food, 
drink, 
tobacco 
Chemical 
industry 
Timber, 
wooden 
furn. 
TOTAL 
1987 
14.9 
12.4 
12.3 
11.6 
11.3 
6225 
1992 
16.4 
12.7 
8.5 
9.2 
8.8 
55.6 
* Total is for the five largest sectors only. 
Source : European Commission, 1994. 
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Combining concentration data and specialisation indices in 
tables 3 and 4, confirms that CEECs' export base is limited 
to less than 10 NACE 2 digit sectors. These sectors include 
chemicals, steel products, traditional consumer goods in-
dustries, food products, textiles, clothing, footwear and wood 
products. Each of these sectors accounts for about 10% of the 
CEECs exports to the Community. The CEECs also have a 
strong revealed comparative advantages for some intermedi-
ate goods, although these account for a small share of their 
export earnings. These are sectors which have a high energy 
content and are capital intensive, e.g. non-metallic mineral 
products, artificial fibres, or low technology products, e.g. 
metal products. The highest values of the specialisation index 
are to be found in this group, in particular for non-metallic 
mineral products, where the CEECs supply 14% of total 
extra-EU imports, or for sub-sectors of the metal product in-
dustry where they also account for more than 10% of extra-
EU imports, as opposed to 3.3% for the industry as a whole. 
TABLE 4 : Absolute number of NACE-3 where CEECs specialise 
1987 
1992 
Source 
Bulgaria 
35 
37 
CSFR 
41 
51 
European Commission 
Hungary 
41 
47 
1994. 
Poland 
45 
47 
Romania 
29 
27 
CEECs 
44 
52 
At the NACE 3 digit product level, the concentration and spe-
cialisation of the CEECs' imports is even clearer. ECSC 
products account for nearly all exports of metal products. For 
chemicals, exports are mainly petrochemicals. Food exports 
are concentrated on meat, fruit and vegetables. Ready-made 
clothing and footwear sub-sectors dominate the textile, foot-
wear and clothing sectors. Some 50% of wood products ex-
ports come from the furniture industry. 
This common trade pattern does not exclude strong inter-
country differences. Hungary does not export wood products, 
but has a relatively strong and diversified export base of elec-
trical products. In addition, it has a relatively high depend-
ence on food exports. The former CSFR has a very weak food 
industry, but a diversified export base with significant exports 
of glassware and motor vehicles as well as printing industry 
products. Polish textiles or textile-related industries have not 
reached, either in terms of specialisation or concentration, the 
degree of development of other CEECs. Like in Hungary, 
Bulgarian timber exports are significant only in the wooden 
furniture sub-sector. At the same time it has diversified ex-
ports of chemical products. Romania is the most atypical 
CEEC trade partner, with clothing and wooden furniture 
representing 40% of total exports. 
1.3. Recent changes in CEECs' export base 
What is most striking about the strong expansion in EU-
CEEC trade since 1989 is that it has taken place across the 
board, and the maintenance of stability in the import struc-
ture, see table 5. Although data is only presented at the 
2-digitlevel, amoredetailed breakdown at the NACE3 digit 
level shows that the sectors which recorded negative import 
growth rates over the period 1990-92 accounted for only 
5.7% of total EU imports from the CEECs. In addition, a 
further 29 sectors representing 37.3% of exports grew more 
slowly over the period 1990-92 compared to 1987-89. This 
expansion occurred in the context of an overall slow-down 
TABLE 5 : Characteristics of EU imports from CEECs 
Sectors 
Extract., prep, metal ores 
Prod, process, metals 
Extract, non-met.en. min 
Manuf. non-met. min. pro 
Chemical industry 
Artificial fibres 
Metal articles 
Mechanical engineering 
Oftice mach. Data process. 
Electrical engineering 
Motor vehicles, parts & a 
Other means of transport 
Instrument engineering 
Food, drink, tobacco 
Textiles 
Leather, leather goods 
Footwear, clothing 
Timber, wooden furniture 
% growth in 
value of imports 
Nace 2 1987-89 
21 16 
22 25 
23 13 
24 15 
25 10 
26 12 
31 19 
32 21 
33 -7 
34 21 
35 12 
36 -18 
37 2 
41 19 
43 - 4 
44 8 
45 8 
46 7 
Paper, paper prod, print 
Rubber, plastics 
Other manufacturing 
Source : European Commission 
48 16 
49 5 
1994. 
1989-92 
20 
14 
40 
31 
14 
16 
49 
23 
68 
29 
39 
44 
33 
4 
25 
32 
30 
17 
14 
26 
24 
Specialisation 
index 
1987 
9 
155 
66 
377 
123 
158 
137 
60 
3 
33 
52 
38 
14 
172 
125 
82 
276 
291 
41 
99 
56 
1992 
13 
167 
127 
417 
99 
165 
237 
72 
4 
45 
74 
20 
15 
151 
105 
114 
270 
260 
42 
98 
48 
Share in total ex-
tra-EU imports 
1987-89 1990-92 
0.4 
4.3 
1.8 
11.4 
4.0 
4.5 
4.1 
1.9 
0.1 
1.0 
1.6 
0.7 
0.4 
5.6 
3.6 
2.3 
8.0 
8.3 
1.2 
2.8 
1.4 
0.5 
6.2 
3.6 
15.9 
4.7 
5.6 
8.1 
2.8 
0.1 
1.6 
2.2 
0.7 
0.5 
6.9 
4.3 
3.9 
9.9 
9.8 
1.5 
3.6 
1.7 
% in total ex-
ports to the EU 
1987 1992 
0.2 
12.4 
0.5 
3.7 
11.6 
0.8 
2.9 
5.2 
0.2 
4.4 
3.2 
1.2 
0.4 
12.3 
6.7 
0.9 
14.9 
11.3 
2.5 
2.0 
2.7 
0.2 
12.7 
0.7 
4.8 
9.2 
0.6 
5.9 
6.2 
0.3 
6.1 
4.7 
1.1 
0.5 
8.5 
5.3 
1.1 
16.4 
8.8 
2.2 
2.3 
2.5 
Market share 
in the EU 
1987-89 
0.4 
0.9 
na 
0.4 
0.4 
0.0 
0.2 
0.3 
0.0 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
0.6 
0.7 
1.9 
1.3 
0.1 
0.2 
2.1 
1990-92 
0.5 
na 
1.3 
na 
0.7 
0.0 
0.4 
0.5 
0.0 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.9 
1.3 
2.7 
1.5 
0.2 
0.3 
2.5 
­ 6 ­
of Community imports in 1990­92 compared to the sub­
period 1987­89. It resulted in the CEECs increasing their 
share of extra­EU imports in all save fifteen products at the 
3­digit level. 
The product composition of CEECs' exports to the Com­
munity has been very stable. If one compares the average 
share of sectors between the two sub­periods 1987­89 and 
1990­92, it appears that the for CEECs on average, the 
weight of no NACE two­digit sector has changed by more 
than 2 percentage points, with some exceptions at the 
country level. The largest fluctuations have been the de­
cline in the share of food products by 4 percentage points 
in Hungary and Poland, and the upsurge in the share of 
clothing and footwear by 8 percentage points in Romania 
and Bulgaria. Although the magnitude of the changes are 
generally small, the direction of the change is common to 
all CEECs, providing some indication of a restructuring 
away from the traditional sectors (steel, chemicals, but to 
a greater extent food) towards sectors where CEECs had an 
initially strong specialisation (non­metallic mineral, ce­
ment, metal products) and to a lesser extent towards more 
processed products (mechanical and electrical engineer­
ing). The only exception to this pattern is the clothing in­
dustry, which gained importance in EU imports from the 
CEECs. 
Changes in the product composition of CEECs' exports 
also reflect the trends in EU import demand. This dimen­
sion is eliminated if we focus on the specialisation indices, 
which exhibits no strong trend over time. The CEECs 
strengthened their market position only for metal products 
(NACE 31) in the last years. 
Focusing on 1992 changes only, some discontinuity com­
pared to 1990­91 can be detected: it points to a greater con­
centration of CEECs' imports in the steel sector (NACE 
22), a greater specialisation in the textile and clothing sec­
tors (NACE 43 & 45), and a levelling of the export per­
formance in the non­metal mineral sector (NACE 24). 
If changes in concentration and specialisation are com­
bined, the overall picture of stability is confirmed. There 
are only three sectors where the trend in CEECs' export 
performance points to a uniform improvement or worsen­
ing across sectors and countries: these are chemicals 
(NACE 25) and food (NACE 41) on the negative side and 
metal tools (NACE 31) on the positive side. For the other 
key sectors, the stability at the aggregate level hides sig­
nificant shifts in trade performance between countries or 
within NACE 2 digit sectors, although no systematic pat­
tern which might point to a trend in the changes can be de­
tected at this stage. This suggests that, in the absence of 
major product restructuring of CEECs' imports, some re­
organisation around sub­sectors within the same NACE 2 
digit category is taking place. 
2. THE MARKET ACCESS CONDITIONS IN 
THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS : AN OVER­
VIEW 
2.1. General provisions 
The degree of trade liberalisation by the EU is evidenced 
by the fact, see table 6, that on the date of entry into force 
of the IAs, both tariffs and quantitative restrictions on some 
50% of the value of all industrial imports from CEECs 
were abolished. Although these moves partly reflect the 
confirmation of previous concessions, including the grant­
ing of GSP eligibility, they nevertheless show a funda­
mental improvement in market access compared to the 
pre­1989 situation. This rapid liberalisation is in sharp con­
trast to the lengthy negotiations on market access which 
formed part of the Uruguay GATT Round (and which took 
more than seven years to complete), and reflects the high 
priority which the EU has attached to supporting economic 
transformation in the CEECs. The degree of trade libera­
lisation which the EU has granted is also in contrast with 
the more limited improvements in market access granted 
by some other countries. 
The scale of CEEC exports falling under this general provi­
sion (Article 3 in IA, Article 9 in EA) depends on the com­
modity composition of their trade with the EU. Bulgaria re­
corded the highest percentage, over 55%, which can enter 
the EU free of restrictions, and most other CEECs witness 
similar levels of access. Only Romania recorded a signifi­
cantly lower figure (25%), a result almost entirely ex­
plained by the importance of textiles and clothing in Roma­
nian exports to the EU. 
TABLE 6 : Breakdown of market access conditions of imports from CEECs 
Basic products A (Annex Ha) 
Basic products Β (Annex Π b) 
Sensitive products (Annex Π) 
Textiles (Protocol 1) 
ECSC coal (Protocol 2) 
ECSC steel (Protocol 2) 
Other industrial products 
Total 
ex­
%trd. 
1.1 
0.0 
26.3 
12.9 
2.4 
8.2 
49.1 
100 
CSFR 
MFN 
5.3 
6.2 
8.8 
12.1 
1.3 
4.0 
5.1 
6.8 
Hungary 
%trd. 
0.2 
0.2 
20.1 
21.3 
0.0 
3.7 
54.5 
100.0 
MFN 
5.0 
6.0 
8.8 
12.5 
0.5 
3.5 
5.1 
7.5 
in 1992 
Poland 
%trd. 
0.3 
0.7 
23.4 
18.8 
7.2 
4.9 
44.7 
100.0 
MFN 
7.5 
3.7 
7.9 
13.3 
3.4 
3.3 
3.6 
6.4 
Romania 
%trd. 
0.0 
0.4 
29.9 
37.8 
0.0 
6.5 
25.4 
100.0 
MFN 
4.3 
6.0 
6.7 
13.3 
0.4 
4.6 
6.1 
S.9 
Bulgaria 
%trd. MFN 
0.4 4.0 
0.6 3.6 
8.7 8.7 
28.1 12.8 
0.2 8.3 
6.5 3.9 
55.5 4.6 
1 (*).(> 7.2 
% trd. = % share in total imports of EU from respective CEEC partner. 
MFN = 1992 MFN tariffin %. 
Note : references in parenthesis refer to the text of the IAs. 
Source : Möbius and Schumacher, 1994. 
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Exceptions to the general provision are some basic prod-
ucts listed in Annexes IIa and IIb to the IAs, sensitive prod-
ucts listed in Annex III, textiles and clothing products (Pro-
tocol 1) and certain ECSC products (Protocol 2). All 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) were removed when the IAs 
took effect with the exception of certain textile and cloth-
ing products (which remain subject to quantitative restric-
tions until these have been progressively phased out), and 
certain coal products imported into Spain and Germany. 
Tariff reductions on the above mentioned product cat-
egories are phased so as to achieve complete liberalisation 
by 1 January, 1997 for the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary, and Poland, and 1 January 1998 for Bulgaria and 
Romania. The 1997 deadline is somewhat misleading, 
since tariffs on all industrial products will be abolished by 
1 January 1995, with the exception of residual and substan-
tially reduced tariffs on textiles and some coal and steel 
products: moreover, zero tariffs already apply to most out-
ward processing trade (textiles). Liberalisation timetables 
are similar but not identical, and hence are presented on per 
country basis in tables A to E. 
2.2. Basic industrial products1 
A first category of exempted products concerns certain 
basic products and raw material listed in Annex Ha and 
Annex lib to the IAs, the coverage of which is not the same 
for all associated countries. The products include salt, sul-
phur, earths and stone, alkali metals, leather, ferro-alloys, 
unwrought aluminium and lead, and other base metals, see 
table 7. It is evident from table 6 that these products repre-
sent only a small percentage of the total exports from 
CEECs to the EU, with the highest figures of 1 % for CSFR, 
Poland and Bulgaria. 
As regards tariffs on items in annex Ha, the EU reduced 
duties to 50% of the basic duty when the IAs entered into 
force, and eliminated the remainder one year later. This 
implies that as of 1 January, 1994, the EU has not applied 
these tariffs on imports from any associated country. On 
products listed in Annex lib, EU tariffs were reduced by 
20% of the initial duty on the date of entry into force, and 
by a further 20% at the beginning of the second calendar 
after the entry into force. Total abolition is to be achieved 
by the end of the second year. Therefore, they no longer are 
applied to imports from Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, and will be eliminated at the end of 
1994 on imports from Romania and Bulgaria. Initially, the 
IAs provided for complete removal of tariffs after four 
years : however, liberalisation was speeded up as part of the 
Copenhagen conclusions. 
TABLE 7 : 
Annex Ha 
Annex lib 
Main products listed in 
Bulgaria 
Leather 
Unwrought lead 
Cadmium 
Aluminium 
Unwrought zinc 
Annex Ha and lib of the Interim Europe Agreements 
former CSFR 
Tantalum 
Aluminium 
Ferro-(silico-)chromium 
Ferro-silicon 
Hungary 
Alum, oxide &hydroxide 
Leather 
Titanium 
Ferro-solico-manganese 
Aluminium 
Poland 
Ferro-chrom. 
Leather 
Salt 
Zinc 
Romania 
Leather 
Tungsten 
Zirconium 
Unwrought aluminium 
Source : Möbius and Schumacher, 1994. 
2.3. Sensitive products2 
The products listed in Annex III roughly correspond to the 
'sensitive products' within the GSR The products affected 
vary in each IA and are listed in table 8. They represent a 
sizeable share of total CEEC exports to the Community, 
ranging from 8.7% in Bulgaria to 29.9% in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics in 1992. 
All quantitative restrictions on these products were abol-
ished on the date of entry into force of the IAs, but remain 
subject to either tariff quotas or tariff ceilings. In both 
cases, tariffs on imports below a pre-determined threshold 
are suspended: with quotas they are automatically re-intro-
duced once this level is breached, whereas with ceilings the 
Commission retains discretion as regards their reimposition. 
Furthermore, re-imposed duties on imports exceeding tariff 
quotas and ceilings are reduced annually by 15% of the basic 
duty (10% for Hungary). Also, the actual thresholds for tariff 
quotas or ceilings are increased by 20% per annum from the 
date of entry into force of the agreement (15% for Hungary). 
All tariff quotas and ceilings will be phased out three years 
after the IAs take effect, i.e. end 1994 for Hungary, Poland 
1 Annexes Ha and lib to the IA. 
2 Annex III to the IA. 
and Czech and Slovak Republics and end 1995 for Romania 
and Bulgaria. The initial IAs provided for complete libera-
lisation after five years, but this was accelerated as part of the 
package agreed in Copenhagen. 
The liberalisation has considerably improved market ac-
cess for products from the CEECs, in contrast with their 
previous status as state trading economies. Furthermore, 
the actual degree of protection which the EU has retained 
during the liberalisation has been very light. Many of the 
tariff quotas are non-binding, in that supply side factors 
prevent the CEECs reaching the quota levels. In addition, 
tariff ceilings are unlikely to constitute a significant trade 
barrier as the reimposition of tariffs only occurs if ceilings 
are broken by a very large amount, and also if the proposal 
is supported by several Member States. Furthermore, a 
ceiling is only likely to be breached well into the calendar 
year, and delays in administrative procedures mean that the 
reimposition of tariffs may take several months to be en-
acted. This means that the reimposition of relatively low 
tariff rates will tend to occur towards the end of the calendar 
year, which subsequently will be suspended at the begin-
ning of the following calendar year. 
TABLE 8 : Most important sensitive products 
Bulgaria 
Product 
Footwear, uppers of 
leather 
Disodium carbonate, 
sodium bicarbonate 
Mixtures of urea 
Ammonium nitrate 
Certain mineral or 
chemical fertilisers, 
nitrogenous 
Ethylene glycol iron 
or steel 
Urea 
Vitamin C senger 
cars 
Tableware, porcelain 
or china bleware, 
porcelain or china 
Mixtures of 
ammonium nitrate 
share* 
in% 
32 
1.6 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
0.5 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
ex­CSFR 
Product 
Passenger cars 
Cement 
Furniture (metal, 
wooden, etc) 
Footwear, uppers of leather 
Tubes, pipes, etc. of 
iron or steel 
Seats 
Glassware for 
households, etc. 
Trucks 
Pneumatic tyres and 
inner tubes, of mbber 
Tractors 
in EU imports from CEECs, 
share* 
in% 
4.5 
2.1 
1.9 
1.8 
1.7 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0 
1.0 
0.9 
Hungary 
Product 
Footwear, uppers of 
leather 
Polymers of styrene 
Seats 
Electric filament or 
discharge lamps 
Polyvinyl chloride 
Pneumatic tyres and inner tubes, of rubber 
Sheets, bands 
Polythene 
Suitcases, bags 
Horticultural sheet glass, wired glass 
1992 
share* 
in% 
3.2 
1.6 
1.5 
1.2 
1.1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
Poland 
Product 
Furniture (metal, etc.) 
Passenger cars 
Seats 
Cement 
Footwear, uppers of 
leather 
Copper bars, rods, 
profiles, wire 
Casein 
Pneumatic tyres and 
inner tubes, of rubber 
Mixtures of urea 
6­Hexanelactam 
share* 
in% 
3.3 
3.3 
2.5 
1.2 
1.0 
0.7 
0.7 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
Romania 
Product 
Furniture (metal, 
wooden, etc.) 
Seats 
Footwear, uppers of 
leather 
Cement 
Glassware for table, 
etc. 
Tubes, pipes etc. of 
iron or steel 
Mixture of 
ammonium nitrate 
Passenger cars 
Tableware, porcelain or china 
Pneumatic tubes and 
inner tubes, of mbber 
share* 
in% 
11.7 
5.1 
2.9 
2.0 
1.4 
1.0 
0.4 
0.7 
0.6 
0.4 
* Share in EC imports of industrial products from the respective country. 
Source : Möbius and Schumacher. 
2.4. Textiles and clothing1 
TABLE 9 : Overview of EU­CEECs trade in textiles and clothing 1988­92 
1988 
9.1 Imports (MECU) 
CEEC5 
Poland 
CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Extra­EC 
9.2 Annual 
CEEC5 
Poland 
CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Extra­EC 
339 
64 
154 
68 
37 
16 
9699 
growth rate of in 
TEXTILES 
1989 
356 
66 
159 
74 
37 
20 
10730 
ι por Is (%) 
5.0 
3.8 
3.2 
8.9 
­0.8 
23.4 
10.6 
1990 
415 
85 
179 
98 
32 
20 
11425 
16.6 
28.8 
12.2 
33.6 
­12.0 
1.5 
6.5 
9.3 Share in total EU imports from the CEECs (%) 
CEEC5 3.2 2.9 3.2 
Poland 
CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
1.9 
7.0 
3.1 
1.7 
3.5 
9.4 Trade balance (MECU) 
CEEC5 348 
1.7 
6.2 
2.8 
1.4 
3.7 
462 
1.7 
6.6 
3.4 
2.0 
3.4 
551 
1991 
498 
116 
233 
99 
29 
21 
11890 
20.1 
36.0 
30.3 
1.1 
­10.7 
5.1 
4.1 
3.1 
1.9 
5.7 
2.7 
2.0 
2.8 
809 
1992 
581 
129 
287 
98 
29 
38 
11630 
16.7 
11.3 
23.4 
­1.5 
1.9 
78.7 
­2.2 
3.1 
1.8 
5.2 
2.5 
2.1 
4.2 
119 
CEEC5 
Poland 
CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Extra­EC 
CEEC5 
Poland 
CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Extra­EC 
CEEC5 
Poland 
CSFR 
Hungary 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
CEEC5 
1988 
1072 
304 
108 
274 
352 
34 
15958 
10.3 
9.1 
4.9 
12.7 
15.8 
7.3 
­936 
CLOTHING 
1989 
1185 
336 
116 
307 
389 
38 
17985 
10.5 
10.3 
7.1 
12.1 
10.5 
11.7 
12.7 
9.8 
8.7 
4.5 
11.9 
15.3 
7.1 
­994 
1990 
1406 
508 
141 
362 
337 
57 
20551 
18.6 
51.3 
22.3 
18.1 
­13.4 
51.5 
14.3 
10.8 
9.8 
5.3 
12.4 
21.0 
9.8 
­1147 
1991 
1917 
750 
277 
456 
343 
91 
25553 
36.4 
47.7 
95.5 
26.0 
1.7 
59.2 
24.3 
11.9 
12.1 
6.8 
12.6 
23.4 
12.1 
­1530 
1992 
2580 
979 
411 
573 
463 
154 
26511 
34.6 
30.6 
48.6 
25.5 
34.8 
69.6 
3.7 
13.7 
13.8 
7.4 
14.4 
33.0 
17.2 
­2075 
9.5 Share in total extra­EU imports of textiles (%) 
CEEC5 3.5 3.3 
Source : COMEXT, SITC categories 65 and 84 
3.6 4.2 5.0 CEEC5 6.7 6.6 6.8 7.5 9.7 
Protocol No. 1 and the Additional Protocol to the IAs. 
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Textiles and clothing represent an important and growing 
share of CEEC exports to the EU. In 1992, textiles and 
clothing represented 16.7% of the total value of CEEC ex-
ports to the EU, compared with 13.5% in 1988. In 1992, the 
share of textiles and clothing in total exports to the EU (in 
value terms) ranged from 12.6% in the case of the former 
CSFR to 35% in the case of Bulgaria. Table 9 presents an 
overview of the EU-CEEC trade in textiles and clothing 
over the period 1988-1992. In general, exports of textiles 
and clothing from the CEECs to the EU performed strongly 
over this period compared to exports from all third 
countries. Table 9 shows that the EU has a trade surplus 
with the CEECs in textiles and a trade deficit in clothing. 
This partly reflects the importance of OPT, i.e. the EU ex-
porting fabrics which are then re-imported as clothing. 
Hence, the picture that emerges is one of significant two-
way trade between the EU and the CEECs, with much of 
this trade resulting from the growing internationalisation 
of the location of production. However, the EU market 
share of CEEC products in 1992 was only 0.6% for textiles 
and 3.5% for clothing (including OPT). 
Prior to the beginning of economic transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe, EU imports of textiles and clothing 
produces from the CEECs were managed through bilateral 
agreements negotiated under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
(MFA). The MFA is the multilateral agreement which aims 
at the orderly and equitable development of trade in certain 
textile and clothing products through the reduction of trade 
barriers and the avoidance of disruptive effects in individ-
ual markets. EU policy is to negotiate bilateral agreements 
whereby the exporting countries agree to restrict their ex-
ports to agreed levels. Since the administration of these 
quantitative restrictions is the responsibility of the export-
ing countries themselves, they function as a form of volun-
tary export restraint. 
In order to encourage economic recovery in the CEECs and 
support the transition to a market economy, the EU in-
creased certain important quotas in 1990 and 1991, for the 
Visegrad countries, and similarly in 1991 and 1992 for Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. The additional quotas for Outward 
Processing Traffic (OPT) operations were improved in 
1991 on being incorporated into the bilateral textiles agree-
ment. OPT occurs when firms export semi-finished prod-
ucts for further processing and subsequent reimport. These 
measures, together with the granting of GSP tariff treat-
ment, therefore pre-date the IAs themselves. 
The market access conditions for textiles and clothing are 
contained in Protocol N° 1 to the IAs as regards tariff con-
cessions, and in the Additional Protocol on textiles as re-
gards quantitative aspects. Although outside the scope of 
the MFA, the Additional Protocols follow the normal 
structure of MFA type bilateral agreements and they use 
the standard EU product categorisation system. 
The IAs provide for the elimination of tariffs over five 
years (originally six but reduced to five by a decision of the 
European Council at Copenhagen) while quotas between 
the parties will be eliminated on 1 January 1998 (Visegrad 
four) and 1 January 1999 (Romania and Bulgaria). In addi-
tion, a special tariff exemption is already granted for OPT 
operations under the relevant EU regulation. 
Erzan and Holmes (1992) examined EU imports from the 
CEECs over the period 1985-1989. They concluded that 
the CEECs were as constrained as other MFA suppliers but 
speculated that this situation would improve as the CEECs 
negotiated preferential access to the EU market. In order to 
assess whether this has indeed been the case, a number of 
measures of restrictiveness based on 1992 EU imports are 
presented in table 10. Firstly, the number of quotas applied 
to the CEECs has dropped significantly from 71 in 1986 to 
44 in 1992 and 34 in 1993. More significantly, the number 
of binding quotas has fallen even more from 47 in 1986 to 
5 in 1992. A complementary measure is provided by aver-
age quota utilisation rates for 1992.21 There are problems 
associated with the interpretation of each of these 
measures : nonetheless the EU has granted considerable 
liberalisation to the CEECs, and that there is little evidence 
to suggest that they are constrained suppliers, at least in a 
direct sense. 
More recent data for 1993 presented in table 11 indicates 
very low average quota utilisation rates for direct quotas in 
1993. The highest figure is for the Czech Republic at 54% 
and the lowest for Hungary at 26%. These figures further 
reinforce the conclusion of a lack of restrictiveness of EU 
measures. 
2.5. ECSC products2 
Steel products (Chapter 1, Article 2 of the protocol) : the 
share of these various ECSC products in total imports varies 
Quotas are considered to be binding according to the measure pro-
posed by Erzan and Holmes (1992), i.e. a utilization rate of above 
90%. R. Erzan and C. Holmes (1992) 'The restrictiveness of the 
Multi Fibre Arrangement on Eastern European Trade', PRE 
working document WPS 860, International Economics Depart-
ment, World Bank. 
Protocol 2 of the IA. 
TABLE 10 : 
CEECS 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
Hungaria 
Poland 
Romania 
Quota utilisation rates 1986-93 
1986* 
71 (47) 
25(8) 
55 (37) 
37 (22) 
37(21) 
42 (25) 
1989* 
54 (37) 
11(1) 
40(26) 
29(17) 
31 (20) 
35 (20) 
1992* 
44(5) 
15(2) 
25(1) 
19(0) 
20(0) 
35(2) 
1993* 
34 
11 
23 
16 
15 
28 
AQUR** import 
33 
47 
50 
24 
33 
19 
AQUR** OPT 
39 
44 
36 
32 
38 
54 
AQUR** avg. 
35 
46 
47 
28 
35 
25 
Figures in parentheses represent the absolute number of binding quotas. 
* absolute number ** AQUR = average quota utilisation rate for 1992. 
Source : European Commission, 1994. 
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considerably from 3.7% for Hungary to 8.2% for the Czech 
and Slovak Republics. All quantitative re strictions were re­
moved when the IAs took effect, and tariffs, with the excep­
tion of Bulgaria, follow an identical liberalisation time­
table, i.e. to 80% of the basic duty on the entry into force, 
and subsequently to 60%, 40%, 20%, and 0% at the begin­
ning of subsequent years. Hence, January 1996 will mark 
the end of tariffs for Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics followed by Romania one 
year later. In the case of Bulgaria, duties are reduced by 
20% annually from the entry into force of the agreement so 
as to abolish all duties by the end of the fourth year. 
TABLE 11 : Direct quota utilisation rate, 1993 (%) 
Poland 
Hungary 
Czech Republic 
Slovakia 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
34 
26 
54 
35 
32 
36 
Source : Commission services. 
Regarding coal products (Chapter 2, Article 6), tariffs were 
reduced to 50% of the basic level on 1 January 1994. On 1 
January 1996 the remaining duties will be eliminated. Some 
minor exceptions to these rules apply to Bulgaria. Romania 
does not export coal products to the EU, however these prod­
ucts represented 7.2% of total Polish exports to the Commun­
ity in 1992. Coal products, along with textiles, are the only 
commodity for which the IA permits the EU to retain quanti­
tative restrictions. All QRs were abolished one year after the 
entry into force of the agreements with the exception of im­
ports going to Germany and Spain, where national quantitat­
ive restrictions must be eliminated at the latest four years after 
the entry into force of the agreement. 
trated in section 2.3, tariff ceilings in practice are not likely 
to be a big constraint. Complete liberalisation of sensitive 
will be achieved by the end of 1994 for Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, and at the end of 1995 for 
Romania and Bulgaria. This means that taking account of the 
general provisions, products listed in annexes Ha, Db and ΓΠ, 
some 75% of industrial imports from Hungary will be free of 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions by the end of 1994, with 
equivalent figures of 77% for the Czech and Slovak Re­
publics and 69% for Poland.J With a delay of one year, simi­
lar conditions will prevail for 65% of imports from Bulgaria 
and for 56% of imports from Romania 
The pace and depth of liberalisation can be gauged from 
table 12, which illustrates the (estimated) average tariff 
rates resulting from the provisions in the Europe Agree­
ments and the Copenhagen Council conclusions. These av­
erage tariff rates are weighted according to the commodity 
structure of imports in 1992, and hence differences among 
CEECs occur due to divergent trade patterns. The average 
MFN rate in 1992 ranged from 8.9% for Romania (on ac­
count of a high share for textiles) to 6.4% for Poland. GSP 
status considerably lowered the actual levels of tariffs paid 
(approximately by one third), and these reductions were 
more or less doubled on the entry into force of the IAs. 
2.6. Overall assessment 
TABLE 12 : Tariff reduction as foreseen ir 
. 
CSFR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
ments and 
MFN 
'92* 
6.8 
7.5 
6.4 
8.9 
7.2 
GSP 
'91** 
4.4 
4.5 
4.0 
6.2 
5.2 
Copenhagen 
92*** '93 
2.1 n.a. 
2.5 n.a. 
2.4 n.a. 
n.a. 4.8 
n.a. 3.0 
the Europe Agréé­
conclusions 
'94 
1.4 
1.9 
1.7 
u.a. 
n.a. 
es 
0.7 
1.2 
1.1 
3.6 
2.3 
'96 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
2.2 
1.6 
'97 '98 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
n.a. 0.0 
n.a. 0.0 
* MFN duty rate weighted by 8—digit CN imports within each NACE sector. 
** GSP duty actually paid. 
*** Duties as foreseen in the Interim Europe Agreements and the Copenhagen 
conclusions. 
Source: Mobius & Schumacher, 1994. 
Overall, the interim Europe Agreements constitute a very 
substantial trade liberalisation package, the scale and pace 
of which is without precedent in the EU, or in other indus­
trialised countries. Aside economic benefits accruing to the 
CEECs from the approximation of laws, the 'national treat­
ment' of enterprises as well as economic and financial and 
cultural cooperation, over fifty percent of their trade 
achieved entry into the EU free of tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions on the day of entry into force of the IAs. Only 
low tariffs were imposed on basic industrial products, 
representing a minor share in total imports, and these have 
since been terminated for Hungary, Poland and Czech and 
Slovak Republics, and will cease to be applied to imports 
from Romania and Bulgaria at the end of 1994. 
The main exceptions to immediate free trade concern sensi­
tive products, ECSC products, textiles and clothing : even in 
these sectors, liberalisation has been substantive and rapid. 
For sensitive products, all quantitative restrictions were im­
mediately revoked, and tariffs below tariff quotas and ceilings 
have been suspended. Tariff quotas have not proved binding 
in many cases due to supply side constraints, and as illus­
Tariff rates fall progressively throughout the liberalisation 
timetable, and currently in 1994 a very low average tariff rate 
of under 2% applies to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. Bulgaria faced an average tariff rate of 3% 
in 1993, which is still very low, whereas the 1993 rate for Ro­
mania of 4.8% is explained by the high concentration of tex­
tiles in total imports, and the relatively slow liberalisation 
compared with other industrialised products. 
3. CONTINGENT PROTECTION AND RULES 
OF ORIGIN 
3.1. The scope of EU 
against CEECs 
anti­dumping measures 
In addition to the liberalisation described in section 1 
above, the Europe and Interim Europe Agreements also 
contain provisions which allow the EU to apply contingent 
1 It should be noted that the real percentage of CEEC imports enter­
ing the EU will be higher than the figures presented above, given 
the zero percent tariffs applied to outward processing traffic (tex­
tiles). 
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protection measures (anti-dumping and safeguard actions) 
against the CEECs. This has raised the issue of whether 
such measures could impose high explicit and 'implicit 
threat' costs on CEEC exporters, could damage EU con­
sumers and intermediate users, could deter FDI investment 
in the CEECs, and finally could encourage collusion 
among CEEC enterprises so as to avoid anti-dumping 
measures, thus conflicting with the goal of establishing a 
competitive (multi-producer) market economy. 
Prior to the collapse of the communist regimes, CEECs ac­
counted for roughly 20% of all EU dumping actions, far 
higher than their share in total extra-EC imports. However, 
since the mid-1980s, the number of investigations initiated 
annually has fallen sharply, from over 20 per year to only 
2 in 1993, see table 13. 
TABLE 1 3 : 
Bulgaria 
fmr. CSFR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Total 
Initiation of anti-dumping cases against CEECs 
19X8 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
6 
19X9 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
6 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 
1 1 
2 1 1 
1 
0 4 2 2 
Source: various annual reports on the Community's anti-dumping activities. 
As illustrated in table 14, there were nineteen anti-dump­
ing measures in force at the end of 1993. Poland faces the 
highest number of measures (6) followed by Romania (5). 
An interesting feature of EU anti-dumping measures 
against CEECs is the high preponderance of price under­
takings (which is potentially of benefit to the exporter)1 
compared with dumping duties applied against other 
countries. The most striking feature of table 14 is that 
dumping measures are applied to very specific tariff lines 
across a narrow range of industrial products, mostly basic 
steel and chemical products. Furthermore, there is no in­
dication whatsoever that the EU is extending the scope of 
anti-dumping actions into areas where the CEECs are ac­
quiring a comparative advantage. 
The very limited nature of anti-dumping actions against 
CEECs is clear from table 15, which examines measures in 
force at the end of 1993 but using 1992 trade data.2 In total, 
only ECU 60 million imports from CEECs were subject to 
anti-dumping measures, representing 0.32% of total imports 
and 0.36% of total industrial imports from the CEECs. Bulga­
ria was most affected with 1.24% of all their exports to the 
EU being affected, followed by Romania with 0.7%. The 
CSFR recorded an incidence of virtually zero (0.05%). It 
should be noted, however, that the low trade coverage figures 
understate the impact on CEECs, on account of the implicit 
threat of anti-dumping measures (which, inter alia, can deter 
inward investment) and also due to the fact that duties/under­
takings almost certainly reduce the actual levels of trade flows. 
1 The exporting enterprise may gain if increased revenues from 
higher prices offset any reduction in producer surplus brought 
about through constrained production. Account should also be 
taken of general welfare losses for the exporting economy, if fac­
tors of production shift away from the constrained industry to less 
efficient sectors. 
2 These figures refer to anti-dumping measures in force against 
CEEC countries on 31 December, 1993, using trade data for 1992. 
However, the orders of magnitude should not have altered sub­
stantially. 
TABLE 14 : Anti-dumping measures in force against CEECs as at 10.12.93 
Product Measure Publication 
1. Czech and Slovak Republics 
Artificial corundum 
Methenamine 
undertakings 
undertakings 
OJL 275, 02.10.91 
OJL 104, 24.01.90 
2. Hungary 
Artificial corundum 
Seamless steel tubes 
urea 
undertakings 
duty + undertakings 
undertakings 
OJL275, 02.10.91 
OJL 120, 15.05.93 
OJL 52, 24.02.89 
3. Bulgaria 
Copper Sulphate 
Methenamine 
Sodium Carbonate 
duties 
undertakings 
OJL23, 27.01.89 
OJL 104, 24.01.90 
duties , ι ι ; ; 
4. Poland 
Artificial corundum 
Ferro-silicon 
Methenamine 
Seamless steel tubes 
Silicon carbide 
Sodium Carbonate 
5. Romania 
Methenamine 
Sodium Carbonate 
Synthetic textile fibres of polyester 
Welded tubes of iron or steel 
Urea 
undertakings 
duty + undertakings 
undertakings 
duty + undertakings 
undertakings 
duties 
undertakings 
duties 
duties 
dudes 
undertakings 
OJL 275, 02.10.91 
OJL 369, 18.12.92 
OJL 104, 24.01.90 
OJ L 120, 15.05.93 
OJL 287, 10.10.86 
OJL 131, 13.05.89 
OJ L 104, 24.04.90 
OJL 131, 13.05.89 
OJL 306, 22.10.92 
OJL91, 06.04.90 
OJ L 52, 24.02.89 
Source: Commission services. 
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TABLE 15 : Evaluation of PECO imports subject to anti-dumping measures in 1992 ('000 Ecu)1 
Measures* 
Art. corundum U 
Copper sulphate D 
Sodium carb. D 
Silicon carbide U 
Methenamine U 
Urea U 
Syn. polyester D 
Ferosilicon D&U 
Seamless steel D&U 
pipes and tubes 
iron or non-alloy 
steel 
Welded tubes of D 
iron or non-alloy 
steel 
Total (ECU ΌΟ0) 
% imports (2) 
% ind. impts (3) 
Poland 
1543 
3067 
8326 
907 
1050 
163 
10203 
5 
6135 
81 
14 
14 
465 
566 
113 
6818 
7401 
62 
2834 
0 
1530 
27461 
0.39% 
0.44% 
fmr. CSFR 
2727 
914 
129 
2542 
814 
67 
13045 
21 
1935 
1023 
0 
4 
2063 
667 
514 
35380 
6152 
5225 
9594 
1235 
1546 
2794 
0.05% 
0.05% 
Hungary 
2862 
0 
5 
1842 
74 
83 
0 
269 
34 
217 
0 
95 
54 
0 
235 
3756 
1409 
2 
69 
87 
804 
8585 
0.22% 
0.26% 
Romania 
11 
326 
701 
2 
45 
8 
3734 
0 
979 
0 
0 
0 
2954 
927 
0 
739 
9 
0 
3999 
0 
349 
9772 
0.70% 
0.73% 
Bulgaria 
0 
14 
10873 
165 
0 
79 
1708 
0 
3451 
23 
0 
53 
45 
0 
4 
929 
7 
0 
1 
104 
0 
11131 
1.24% 
1.42% 
Figures in bold italics are those on which anti-dumping measures currently apply. 
* D = duties', U = undertakings. 
(1) Anti-dumping measures are imposed on very specific products at the 8-digit Combined Nomencleture level. Sometimes, an anti-dumping 
several similar products of the same type, e.g. two specifications of sodium carbonate; This table presents the trade data for all tariff lines 
measures. The figures are not aggregated. 
(2) % of total EU imports from the respective CEEC country. 
(3) % of total industrial EU imports from the respective CEEC country. 
Total 
7132 
14 
19900 
1074 
1050 
317 
3734 
269 
979 
81 
14 
14 
519 
566 
348 
10574 
8810 
0 
3999 
0 
349 
59743 
0.32% 
0.36% 
% of extra 
EU imports 
12.8 
0.1 
17.4 
0.3 
1.6 
10.6 
3.7 
21.3 
0.9 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
1.8 
1.9 
4.9 
13.4 
29.3 
0.0 
12.6 
0.0 
0.7 
measure in imposed on 
subject to anti-dumping 
It is not possible from this data to determine the scale of in­
jury to EU producers. Nonetheless, figures in the final col­
umn which show the share of these imports from CEECs as 
a percentage of total extra-EU imports, suggest that injury, if 
any, is likely to be limited. Of the products subject to anti­
dumping measures in 1992, the CEEC share in extra-EU im­
ports was highest for seamless steel pipes and tubes, 29%. 
However, the CEEC market share (share of CEEC imports in 
total EU consumption) is likely to be small given that steel 
is an industry where domestic producers tend to have high do­
mestic market shares. Hindley (1993),1 has pointed out that 
in this case, the Commission used methods of calculation ap­
plicable to state trading economies (basing the dumping cal­
culations of production costs of a like good in Croatia) and 
offered evidence of dumping for only one out of the five 
goods affected, namely steel tubes. 
3.2. Anti-dumping provisions in the interim 
Europe Agreements 
Essentially the anti-dumping provisions of the IAs imply 
that associated countries fall under market economy rules 
Hindley Brian ( 1993): ' Helping transition through trade? EC and 
US policy towards exports from eastern and central Europe', Eu­
ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Working Pa­
per 4, March 1993. 
Council Regulation EEC/2423 of 11.07.1988 on protection 
against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not Mem­
bers of the European Economic Community, OJ L 209 of 
02.08.1988. Commission Decision ECSC 2424/88 of 29.07.1988 
relates to ECSC products. 
in the calculation of dumping margins as opposed to the 
special provisions relating to state trading economies ap­
plied hitherto. Therefore CEECs no longer fall under Ar­
ticle 2.5 of the basic dumping Regulation2 which deals 
with state trading economies, but instead under to Ar­
ticle 2.3 which applies to all market economies. In other 
words, they receive exactly the same treatment as all other 
trading partners with the exception of members of the 
European Economic Area. 
In practical terms, this has the following implications. The 
calculation of dumping margins for state-trading econ­
omies is usually undertaken on the basis of a comparison 
of prices or costs in a third 'reference' country. The use of 
third 'reference' country previously yielded relatively high 
rates of affirmative findings. 
With the shift to market economy rules, the use of reference 
countries ceases. Instead, the Commission should, wher­
ever possible, examine prices or costs on the domestic 
market of the CEEC concerned in order to determine 
whether actual price discrimination or below cost sales 
have occurred. This change in rules, however, does not 
settle the issue as many problems remain. 
For instance, the difficulties in assessing dumping in an 
economically meaningful manner are likely to be com­
pounded in a situation of economies undergoing a transi­
tion from a command based regime,3 e.g. it will be difficult 
for the Commission authorities to accurately assess domes-
3 see P.K.M. Tharakan ed. (1991): 'Policy implications of anti­
dumping measures', Elsevier Science Publishers, North-Holland. 
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tic prices and costs. Hence, the use of'reference' countries 
is not excluded in very difficult cases. 
One common feature of past anti-dumping cases against 
the CEECs has been the high proportion which have been 
settled with price undertakings. Defendants prefer this out-
come to the imposition of duties since they benefit from 
higher prices. Of all the 272 cases between 1980 and 1987, 
some 72% were terminated with price undertakings, of 
which 55% concerned East European countries. The will-
ingness of the Commission in the past to accept price un-
dertakings from the CEECs was largely explained by the 
relative ease with which they could be monitored, given 
that imports were sourced through a sole exporting author-
ity. This may change as the transition process progresses, 
as monopolies break-up in CEECs and EU imports become 
sources for many producers in the CEECs. Whether or not 
the frequency of price undertakings alters remains to be 
seen. 
The treatment of the CEECs in anti-dumping actions will 
differ from other countries on one respect. Article 27.3c of 
the IA (Article 33 of EA) provides that before any action 
is taken after having determined the existence of dumping 
'the Community or the relevant associated country, as the 
case may be, shall supply the Association Council with all 
relevant information with a view to seeking a solution ac-
ceptable to the two parties'. Article 27.3c of the IA con-
tinues saying 'the Association Council may take any deci-
sion necessary to put into effect an end to the difficulties; 
If it has not taken such a decision within thirty days of the 
matter being referred to it, the exporting party may apply 
appropriate measures on the exportation of the product 
concerned'. In short, the Europe Agreement gives a grace 
period of 30 days from the time the definitive decision is 
announced to the time the measures take effect. This may 
be important in that it will allow the CEEC countries to 
plea their case to an international audience prior to the ac-
tions entering into force. 
3.3. Overall assessment of anti-dumping actions 
From above, it appears that the application of anti-dump-
ing provisions cannot be considered as a deterrent to 'seri-
ous' foreign investors. Only two cases have been initiated 
since the IAs entered into force. Furthermore, anti-dump-
ing measures currently in force affect a marginal percen-
tage of total imports from CEECs, and are concentrated 
across a very narrow range of tariff classifications, mostly 
basic chemical and steel products. There is no indication 
that the EU will extend the scope of anti-dumping 
measures into sectors where the CEECs are acquiring a 
comparative advantage. 
It is most unlikely, based on the data in table 15, that the 
CEECs are engaging in predatory dumping, i.e. setting 
prices below short-run marginal cost in an attempt to drive 
out competitors and secure monopoly power (and profits) 
in the long-run. In practice, the necessary conditions to 
conduct predatory pricing (market power, ability to prevent 
market entry, ability to endure losses) arise infrequently, 
especially for financially weak CEEC enterprises which 
tend to have very small market shares in the EU. 
Instead, if CEEC firms are engaged in dumping, then this 
is likely to take the form of either cyclical dumping or 
dumping financed through government subsidies. Cycli-
cal dumping occurs when firms set prices below average 
costs, and is more likely to occur in industries with large 
fixed costs, e.g. steel, chemicals. These non-predatory 
forms of dumping may cause injury to EU producers. Ac-
count should, however, be taken of the benefits through 
lower prices to EU consumers, and to enterprises who use 
CEEC imports as intermediate imports. Hence, there is a 
need to take a balanced approach in such cases weighing up 
costs all the costs and benefits. Where dumping does occur, 
the first best response may be to strengthen the competition 
framework in the CEECs (see European Commission, 
1994). The Europe Agreements contain comprehensive 
provisions for approximation of competition laws in the 
CEECs to those of the EU. 
3.4. Safeguard actions 
A general safeguard clause in the IAs, Article 24, states 
"Where a product is being imported in such increased quantities 
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause (a) seri-
ous injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive 
products in the territory of one of the contracting parties, or (b) se-
rious disturbances in any sector of the economy or difficulties 
which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic sit-
uation of a region, the Community or the relevant associated coun-
try may take appropriate measures under the conditions and in ac-
cordance with the procedures laid down in Art.27", 
Article 27 of the IA stipulates the administrative procedures 
for implementing the general safeguard of Article 24. In case 
of presumed threat to domestic producers, the "injuring" 
party is to be informed and all relevant information should be 
made available with a view of seeking an agreement between 
both parties; failure to resolve the dispute results in "any ap-
propriate measure" being taken, but "in the selection of 
measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb 
the functioning of the Agreement". 
In addition to the general safeguard clause, there are addi-
tional specific safeguard regimes, e.g. Articles 15 
(Hungary, Poland, ex-CSFR) & Article 16 (Romania, Bul-
garia) of the IAs provide for safeguard actions with respect 
to agriculture.1 There are also supplementary safeguard 
measures which can be introduced by the CEECs against 
imports from the EU, designed to take account of the spe-
cific problems facing economies undergoing transition. 
These include Articles 22 & 23 of the IA2 which allows 
CEECs to apply exceptional measures for a limited dur-
1 Article 15 for Hungary, Poland, and the Check and Slovak Repub-
lics, Article 16 for Romania and Bulgaria. 
2 Article 22 for Hungary, Poland, and the Check and Slovak Repub-
lics, Article 23 for Romania and Bulgaria. 
3 Article 25 of the IA allows to apply appropriate safeguard mea-
sures on exports in case of "(i) re-export towards a third country 
against which the exporting country maintains, for the product 
concerned, quantitative export restrictions, export duties or mea-
sures having equivalent effect, or (ii) a serious shortage, or threat 
thereof, of a product essential to the exporting country". 
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ation to protect infant industries and certain sectors under­
going restructuring or facing serious difficulties.3 
The safeguard provisions in the IA differ from those per­
mitted under GATT Article XIX, since the former are se­
lectively applied (to associated countries) rather than the 
multilateral application of the latter. This selective applica­
tion is justified given that the IAs provide additional trade 
liberalisation beyond MFN status. Selective application 
means that IA provisions differ from those under GATT 
Article XIX in two important respects. Firstly, whereas the 
conditions under which the safeguard actions can be im­
plemented are identical, the définition of injury differs 
somewhat. For example, the IA references to "serious dis­
turbances" and "serious deterioration in the economic 
situation" are not precisely defined, and there is no refer­
ence, as in EC Regulation 288/82,1 to the basic concept of 
"unforeseen developments". Secondly, the administrative 
procedures in the IA rules do not provide for a formal in­
vestigation as specified in EC Regulation 288/82. 
In practice, however, such legal differences have had little 
practical effect, and certainly have not negated the trade 
liberalisation achieved in the market access provisions. 
This is evidenced by the fact that Article 24 of IA has been 
applied only once since the IAs entered into force. The 
Commission authorised Germany, France and Italy to im­
pose quotas on imports of certain iron and steel products 
coming from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, after 
bilateral discussions on voluntary action had failed. These 
measures were temporary and lapsed on 31 December 
1992.2 For the years 1993, 1994 and 1995, the EU has 
agreed with Czech and Slovak authorities to limit the an­
nual growth rate of imports on some five steel products and 
product groups.3 It should be borne in mind, however, that 
prior to the entry into force of the IAs, the CEECs were not 
subject to normal EU safeguard rules, but rather to special 
provisions with respect to state­trading economies.4 
3.5. Rules of origin 
Rules of origin are relevant in the context of preferential 
trade arrangements since they determine which exports 
from associated countries can benefit from preferential 
trade concessions. In particular, they may play an import­
ant role in determining the level of FDI in CEECs, as EU 
enterprises may wish to take advantage of lower costs for 
labour­intensive phases of production process. 
Rules of origin distinguish between goods which are wholly 
produced in a given country (e.g. mineral products, agricul­
tural products), and goods where two or more countries con­
tribute to production, hi the latter case, the key issue concerns 
where the last substantial transformation takes place, for 
1 This Regulation was recently replaced by Regulation 518/94 of 7 
March, 1994. 
2 Article 24 of the IA entitles the affected party to take selective "ap­
propriate measures" in the event of increased quantities that cause 
or threaten to cause serious regional problems! 3 Decision N°l of the EC­Czech Republic and Slovak Republic 
Joint Committee of 28 May, 1993 (93/373/ECSC) in OJ L 157 of 
29.06.1993. 4 Council Regulation N° 1765/82 of 30 June 1982 on common 
rules for imports from State­trading countries. 
which three general tests are employed. These are a change 
of tariff heading in a specified nomenclature, the undertaking 
of a prescribed Hst of manufacturing or processing oper­
ations, and the application of an ad valorem rule, either refer­
ring to a threshold amount of value added from a manufactur­
ing process, or an upper limit on the value of the imported 
materials and/or components in the final product. 
The impact of rules of origin on an associated country de­
pends on a number of factors, the most important of which 
are the thresholds contained in the tests described above, e.g. 
the local content requirements in ad valorem rules. Also, the 
costs of compliance with mies of origin must be low relative 
to the tariff and non­tariff barriers if preferential trade arrange­
ments are to be meaningful. Analyses of the GSP with respect 
to developing countries have documented cases where the 
costs associated with satisfying the rules of origin were so 
high as to induce exporters to pay the relevant MFN tariff. An 
additional important factor is whether the origin rule is cumu­
lative, i.e. allows for the aggregation of value added hi all 
countries participating in the preferential trade system. 
The rules of origin in the Europe Agreements are contained 
in a Protocol No.4 on the definition of the concept of "orig­
inating products". Although similar to those applying to 
other EU preferential trade agreements,5 they differ in a 
number of respects as follows 
­ specific conditions are attached as regards products 
wholly obtained in one party, e.g. fish caught by na­
tional vessels (Article l);6 
­ a change of tariff heading is the general rule used for 
determining sufficient transformation. However, ex­
ceptions are listed in the Annex Π of the Protocol. The 
existence of this list means that there is no provision for 
a Technical Committee on Origin to mediate disputes, 
as occurs in trade with countries with whom the EU 
does not have a preferential trade arrangement. The ex­
ceptions concern the maximum percentages in value­
added of third country inputs7 and certain specific pro­
cessing operations required to confer origin; 
­ cumulation is allowed between the Visegrad coun­
tries (i.e. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the 
Slovak Republic). Hence, EU inputs are not counted 
in determining foreign value content of Visegrad 
products. In contrast, no intra­CEEC cumulation is 
permitted with respect to Bulgaria and Romania, be­
cause they do not participate in the Visegrad process. 
A systematic analysis of the effects of mies of origin in the 
IA is beyond the scope of this supplement. The institutional 
provisions in the IAs are comparable if not more liberal than 
similar provisions contained in other bilateral trade arrange­
ments and the value added requirements are similar to those 
contained in Annex Π of the EEA Agreement.8 Nonetheless, 
5 Commission Regulation 802/68 of 27 June 1968 on common def­
inition of the notion of origin of goods, OJ N° L148/1 28/6/68. 
6 The term national vessels is defined in the text and subject to spe­
cific conditions which are the same as in the EEA Protocol on rules 
of origin (Art.3(2)). 
7 40% and 50% limits apply for chemicals, metal articles, machin­
ery, clothing, electric engineering articles, tape recorders, TV sets, 
radios, integrated circuits, insulated wires, motor vehicles, etc. 
8 Annex II of the EEA Agreement, as Annex II of the EAs lists all 
the products for which the change in tariff heading criterion was 
not retained and, instead, a specific operation or the value added 
criterion, or both, are indicated to confer origin. 
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a further consideration of the application of mies of origin 
with respect to CEECs could be required if problems arise, 
but this requires a great deal of in-depth study on a sectoral 
basis. Furthermore, compliance costs might be reduced by 
making administrative procedures more transparent and in­
expensive, and possibly by upgrading technical assistance to 
customs authorities in CEECs. 
As regards cumulation, all the IAs/EAs provide for so-
called bi-Iateral cumulation between the EU and CEEC 
country concerned, e.g. EU-Romania or EU-Hungary. Di­
agonal cumulation is permitted among the Visegrad 
countries, e.g. EU-Hungary-Poland. The ΙΑ/EA with Ro­
mania allows for cumulation among Romania and Bulga­
ria: however, the ΙΑ/EA with Bulgaria, following a request 
of Bulgarian authorities, does not provide for cumulation 
with Romania. The differential treatment of the Visegrad 
countries on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Romania on 
the other hand requires reconsideration. However, extend­
ing so-called diagonal cumulation, in principle requires the 
CEECs themselves to co-ordinate their customs activities. 
It should be noted that even among Visegrad countries, 
who in theory operate a diagonal cumulation system, prob­
lems have arisen following the negotiation of separate EAs 
with the Czech and Slovak Republics. In a broader context, 
the Copenhagen Council has invited the Commission to 
carry out a study on the feasibility and impact of rules of 
origin and cumulation between the EC, the CEECs and the 
EFTA countries. 
ANNEX 1 : MARKET ACCESS CONDITIONS 
AND INSTITUTIONAL PROVI­
SIONS 
1. The legal state of play of the Europe Agree­
ments 
The European Union has supported the transition to a 
market economy in the Central and eastern European 
countries (CEECs) by, inter alia, a fundamental and sub­
stantial liberalisation of trade arrangements. As indicated 
on table 16, this has been a phased move, beginning with 
the signing of trade and economic (and commercial) 
cooperation agreements with Hungary in 1988, Poland in 
1989 and subsequently the CSFR, Romania and Bulgaria 
in 1990. Simultaneously, quantitative restrictions specific 
to the CEECs were lifted. In January 1990, Hungary and 
Poland were unilaterally declared eligible for the Genera­
lised System of Preferences (GSP) by the EU, status which 
was accorded to the CSFR and Bulgaria in early 1991. Ro­
mania had received restricted GSP status since 1974, and 
the remaining restrictions were removed in January 1991. 
Trade liberalisation culminated in the signing of six Europe 
Agreements (EAs) between 1991 and 1993, which have as 
their aim the establishment of a bi-lateral free trade area for 
non-agricultural products over a ten year period. The re­
moval of trade restrictions is to occur on an asymmetric 
basis, with the EU liberalising faster and earlier than each 
of the CEECs. In addition to the creation of a bi-lateral free 
trade area, the EAs provide for political dialogue, the ap­
proximation of laws, the 'national treatment' of enterprises 
as well as economic, financial and cultural cooperation. As 
some of these policies fall within the competence of the 
Member States, the EAs can only enter into force following 
their ratification by all EU and CEEC national legislatures, 
a time consuming exercise. In the intervening period, so-
called interim Europe Agreements (IAs) have been applied 
which concern essentially the trade and some trade-related 
aspects of the full Europe Agreements. This was possible 
since trade policy lies within the exclusive competence of 
the EU. As made clear by the declaration of the EU Heads 
of State and Government following their meeting in 
Copenhagen in June 1993, the ultimate goal is the acces­
sion of these countries to the European Union. 
Given that the EAs were signed at different times and hence 
subject to diverging ratification timetables, the legal state 
of play is somewhat diverse.1 Regarding Hungary and 
Poland, Europe Agreements were signed on 16 December 
1991 and came into effect on 1 February, 1994, and Interim 
Europe Agreements have been in operation since 1 March, 
1992. The IAs have been supplemented with Community 
legislation necessary for their legal implementation.2 
For example, such legal acts removed the associated 
countries from the list of countries classified as State trad­
ing economies, which previously rendered them subject to 
a special trade regime. They further specified administra­
tive procedures for provisions in the Interim Agreements 
that involve the discretionary introduction by the EU of 
trade policy measures, e.g. anti-dumping measures, safe­
guard actions, the functioning of tariff-quotas and ceilings. 
Some of the measures with respect to tariff-quotas and ceil­
ings must be reintroduced on an annual basis.3 
1 Furthermore, asratificationisanongoingprocess.theinformation 
provided in this supplement may be out of date even by the time of 
publication. The information presented reflects the status quo as at 
16.02.1994. 
2 Council Regulation EEC/521/92 of 27.02.92 opening and pro­
viding forthe administration of Community tariff quotas and ceil­
ings for certain agricultural and industrial products originating in 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
(1992), OJL 56 of 29.02.92. 
Council Regulation EEC/517/92 amending the autonomous import 
arrangements for products originating in Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, OJ L 517/92 of 29.02.1992. 
Commission Decision ECSC/523/92 on certain modalities forthe 
application of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade related 
matters between the ECSC and EEC of the one part and the Re­
public of Hungary of the other part, OJ L 56 of 29.02.1992. 
Council Regulation EEC/519/92 on certai n procedures for apply 
the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between 
the EEC and the ECSC, of the one part, and the Republic of Hun­
gary of the other part, OJ L 56 of 29.02.1992. 
Commission Decision ECSC/522/92 on certain modalities forthe 
application of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade related 
matters between the ECSC and EEC of the one part and the Re­
public of Poland of the other part, OJ L 56 of 29.02.1992. 
Council Regulation EEC/518/92 on certain procedures for apply 
the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between 
the EEC and the ECSC, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland 
of the other part, OJ L 56 of 29.02.1992. 
3 Council Regulation EEC/3918/92 of 28.12.1992 opening and pro­
viding forthe administration of Community tariff quotas and ceilings 
for certain agricultural and industrial products and establishing a re­
duced variable component for certain agricultural products originat­
ing in Hungary, Poland and the territory of the former Czech and Slo­
vak federal Republic (1993), OJ L 296 of 31.12.1993. 
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TABLE 16 : The legal state of play of the Europe Agreements at 
01.02.1994 
Signed In force Reference 
16.1 Trade and Cooperation Agreements 
Poland** 19.09.1989 01.12.1989 
Hungary ** 26.09.1988 01.12.1988 
CSFR* 07.05.1990 01.11.1990 
Romania 22.10.1990 01.05.1991 
Bulgaria 08.05.1990 01.11.1990 
OJL 339 of 22.11.89 
OJL327 of 30.11.88 
OJL 291 of 23.10.90 
OJL 079 of 26.3.91 
OJL 291 of 23.10.90 
16.2 Europe Agreements 
Poland 16.12.1991 
Hungary 16.12.1991 
Czech Rep. 04.10.1993 
01.02.1994 
01.02.1994 
not yet 
OJL 348 of 31.12.93 
OJL347of31.12.93 
PO Cat No CB-
CO-93-433-.-C 
Slovakia 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
04.10.1993 
01.02.1993 
08.03.1993 
not yet 
not yet 
not yet. 
16.3 Interim Europe Agreement*** 
Poland** 
Hungary** 
Czech Rep. 
Slovakia 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
16.12.1991 
16.12.1991 
16.12.1991*** 
16.12.1991*** 
01.02.1993 
08.03.1993 
01.03.1992 
01.03.1992 
01.03.1992 
01.03.1992 
01.05.1993 
31.12.1993 
PO Cat No CB-
CO-93-433-.-C 
PO Cat No CB-
CO-93-533-.-C 
PO Cat No CB-
CO-93-049-.-C 
OJL 144 of 30.4.92 
OJL 116 of 30.4.92 
OJL 115 of 30.4.92 
OJL 115 of30.4.92 
OJL 81 of 2.4.93 
OJL323 of23.12.93 
* * + 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 
Replaced by Europe Agreement as of 1.2.1994. 
On basis of IA signed on 16.12.1991 with the former CSFR; 
supplementary protocols to the IA take account of the dissolution of 
the CSFR. See OJL 349 of 31.12.1993. 
**** Additional protocols to EA/IA 
on acceleration of implementation of EU trade concessions (following 
Conclusions of Copenhagen European Council — June 93): provisional 
application (P, H, Cz, SK) as of 1.7.1993: OJ L 195 of 4.8.93. The 
additional protocols with each of these countries, as well as with 
Romania and Bulgaria, were signed in December 1993, and are 
published in OJ L 25 of 29.1.94. 
on trade in textiles: provisional application (P, H, Cz, SK) as of 
1.1.1993; OJL410 of 31.12.92. 
The former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic signed 
Europe Agreements on the same date as both Hungary and 
Poland, and an interim Europe Agreement also came into 
force on 1 March, 1992. However, following the division of 
the CSFR, separate agreements were negotiated with the 
Czech and Slovak Republics which were signed on 4 Oc-
tober, 1993. The separate EAs differ in a number of respects 
vis à vis the original, in that they contain a preamble with re-
spect to human rights and the treatment of minorities,1 they 
contain an emergency provision clause allowing the imple-
mentation of the agreement to be suspended without prior 
consultation in special emergency cases, the import quotas 
and ceilings are divided between the two Republics, and fi-
nally, they allow for the cumulation of mies of origin from 
both Republics (and hence cumulation with Hungary and 
Poland). The negotiation of separate EAs has no impact on 
the actual implementation of trade liberalisation. 
Finally, Europe Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria 
were signed on 1 February, 1993, and 8 March 1993 re-
spectively. The IA with Romania entered into force on 
The stipulations are identical to those in the EA's with respect to Ro-
mania and Bulgaria, which were concluded prior to the negotiation of 
separate agreements with the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
1 May 1993. However, an internal EU trade debate delayed 
implementation of the IA with Bulgaria until 31.12.1993. 
In order to redress this delay, the EU considered that 1 Jan-
uary, 1994 marked the second year of application of the IA 
with Bulgaria, bringing the trade liberalisation schedule 
back in line with Romania. 
The market access provisions in all six interim Europe Agree-
ments were upgraded, by speeding up the liberalisation time-
table, as a result of the decision by the EC Heads of State and 
Government at the Copenhagen Council in June 1993. The 
General Affairs Council of July 1993 adopted the necessary 
legal texts to accelerate of the implementation of trade conces-
sions,2 and final amendments to the protocols (as well as with 
Romania and Bulgaria) were signed in December, 1993.3 
ANNEX 2 : OTHER TRADE-RELATED ISSUES 
1. Right of establishment 
It is agreed in principle that both EU and associated CEECs 
will grant each others' companies and nationals "national 
treatment" (i.e. non-discriminatory treatment) for the es-
tablishment of new economic and professional activities in 
each others' territories. As with market access conditions, 
implementation occurs on an asymmetric basis. The EU 
granted national treatment upon entry into force of the 
Europe Agreements, while transitional periods are fore-
seen for this application by the associated countries. Dur-
ing the transition period, these countries may also derogate 
from granting national treatment to Community com-
panies and nationals in order to protect newly emerging in-
dustries and sectors undergoing restructuring. 
2. Competition rules and the approximation of 
laws 
Competition rules, similar to those applied in the Com-
munity will have to be introduced in the associated 
countries (Articles 31 & 32 of the IA). The EU rules con-
cerning agreements between undertakings, abuse of domi-
nant position and State aids shall be assessed 'on the basis 
of criteria arising from the application of the rules of Ar-
ticles 85, 86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community'. The Joint Committee has three 
years from the entry into force of the IAs to adopt the 
necessary rules for the implementation of these provisions. 
However, the six associated countries are considered as 
low income regions where, according to the EC Treaty, de-
velopment-oriented state aids may be authorised. Specific 
rules to be applied to the coal and steel sectors are provided. 
2 Council Decision EEC/93/421 on the provisional application of 
the Additional Protocols to the Interim Agreements on trade and 
trade-related matters between the EEC and the ECSC, of the one 
part, and certain third countries, of the other part, and to the Europe 
Agreements between the European Communities and their Mem-
ber States and the same countries, OJ L 195 of 04.08.93. 
Council Regulation EEC/2232/93 amending Regulation 
EEC/3918/92 opening and providing for the administration of 
Community tariff quotas and ceilings for certain agricultural and 
industrial products andestablishing areduced variable component 
for certain agricultural products originating in Hungary, Poland 
and the territory of the formerCzech and SlovakFederal Republic 
(1993), OJ L 200 of 10.08.1993. 
3 O J L 25 of 29.01.1994. 
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The approximation of laws of the associated countries to 
Community law is a major precondition for economic in­
tegration into the Community. The associated countries are 
required to ensure compatibility of their legislation with EU 
laws and the Community will provide technical assistance for 
this purpose. The following areas will be concerned in par­
ticular: customs laws, company law, banking law, company 
accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of 
workers at the workplace, financial services, mies on com­
petition, protection of health and life of humans, animals and 
plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical mies 
sand standards, transport and the environment. 
3. Some additional areas 
Payments and financial transfers : both parties undertake 
to authorise, in freely convertible currency, any payments 
related to movement of goods, services or persons, as well 
as the financial transfers related to investments, including 
repatriation of capital or investment benefits. 
Intellectual, industrial and commercial property : the asso­
ciated countries will, within five years from the entry into 
force of the Interim Agreements, provide similar levels of 
protection to those existing in the Community. 
Public procurement : non­discriminatory access to public 
contracts is also provided following a transitional period. 
Economic cooperation : a major objective of this cooperation 
is to enable the associated countries to meet the challenge of 
restructuring their economies and achieving competitiveness 
by the end of the transitional period. Economic cooperation 
refers to all areas of mutual interest. In particular, it concerns 
industry including industrial standards, investment promo­
tion and protection, education, training, science and technol­
ogy, agriculture, transport; telecommunications, postal ser­
vices and broadcasting, banking, insurance and other 
financial control, money laundering, regional development, 
social issues, tourism, small and medium sized enterprises, 
information and communication; customs; statistics; econ­
omics; public adrrdnistration and drugs. 
4. Institutional arrangements 
The EAs provide for the creation of Association Councils at 
ministerial level whose task is to monitor the implementation 
of the Agreements. They will have decision­making powers 
within specific areas and will be assisted by Association 
Committees, to which they may delegate any of their powers. 
In addition, Association Parliamentary Committees are es­
tablished for Members of the Parliaments of the associated 
countries and of the European Parliament to meet and ex­
change views. They are entitled to request information from 
the Association Councils and to make recommendations. The 
Association Councils also inform the Association Parliamen­
tary Committees of all decisions taken. 
ANNEX 3 : LIBERALISATION TIMETABLES WITH ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES 
TABLE A : Overview of access 
1. General pro visons 
tariffs 
QRs 
2. Basic products 
Annex IIa­tariffs 
Annex IIb ­ tariffs 
3. Sensitive products (Annex III) 
within tariff­quota 
tariffs 
quota­level 
outside Tariff­quota 
tariffs 
QRs 
4. ECSC products (Protocol 2) 
Steel tariffs 
QRs 
Coal tariffs 
QRs (except) 
QRs in Annex Π 
to EU for industrial products in the EU­
March '92 
0 
abolished 
50 
80 
March '92 
suspended 
115 
March '92 
90 
abolished 
80 
abolished 
100 
Jan. '93 
0 
none 
0 
60 
Jan. '93 
130 
Jan. '93 
80 
none 
60 
none 
100 
abolished 
■Hungary Interim Europe Agreement 
J a n . ' 9 4 
0 
none 
0 
(40)0 
July '93 
(130) 140 
Jan. 94 
70 
none 
40 
none 
50 
Jan. '95 
0 
none 
0 
(20)0 
Jan. '94 
(145) 165 
Jan. ­95 
(60)0 
none 
20 
none 
50 
Jan. '96 
0 
none 
0 
0 
Jan. '95 
abolished 
(160) 
Jan. '96 
(50)0 
none 
(10)0 
none 
0 
abolished 
Jan. '97 
0 
none 
0 
0 
Jan. '96 
(175) 
Jan. '97 
0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
Jan. '98 
0 
none 
0 
0 
Jan. '97 
(abolished) 
Jan. '98 
0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
5. MFA products (Protocol 1) 
tariffs 
ORs 
5/7 5/7 4/7 2/7 
unspecified rate of reduction to 0 after (6) 5 years begining 
Note : The figures presented represent those agreed at the Copenhagen Council. Those in parentheses represent those agreed 
Figures with respect to tariffs reflects rates as % of those appi ied prior to the IA. 
Figures with respect to quantitative restrictions (QRs) reflect quotas as % of those applied at begining of I A. 
1/7 
01.01.1994 
0/(1/7) (0) 
in the initial interim Europe Agrements. 
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TABLE Β : Overview of access to the EU for industrial products in the EU-Poland Interim Europe Agreement 
1. General provisons March '92 
tariffs 0 
QRs abolished 
2. Basic products 
Annex IIa - tariffs 50 
Annex lib - tariffs 80 
3. Sensitive products (Annex III) March '92 
within tariff-quota 
tariffs suspended 
quota-level 120 
outside Tariff-quota March '92 
tariffs 90 
QRs abolished 
4. ECSC products (Protocol 2) 
Steel tariffs 80 
QRs abolished 
Coal tariffs 100 
QRs (except) 
QRs in Annex ΠΙ 
5. MFA products (Protocol 1) 
tariffs 5/7 
Jan. '93 
0 
none 
0 
60 
Jan. '93 
140 
Jan. '93 
80 
none 
60 
none 
100 
abolished 
5/7 
ORs unspecified rate of reduction 
Note : The figures presented represent those agreed at the Copenhagen Council. Those in 
Figures with respect to tariffs reflects rates as % of those appi ied prior to the IA. 
Figures with respect to quantitative restrictions (QRs) reflect quotas as % of those 
Jan. '94 
0 
none 
0 
(40)0 
July '93 
(140) 150 
Jan. 94 
70 
none 
40 
none 
50 
4/7 
to 0 after (6) 5 
Jan. '95 
0 
none 
0 
(20)0 
Jan. '94 
(160)180 
Jan. '95 
(60)0 
none 
20 
none 
50 
2/7 
years begining 
parentheses represent those agreec 
applied at begining of IA. 
Jan. '96 
0 
none 
0 
0 
Jan. '95 
abolished 
(180) 
Jan. '96 
(50)0 
none 
(10)0 
none 
0 
abolished 
1/7 
01.01.1994 
Jan. '97 
0 
none 
0 
0 
Jan. '96 
(200) 
Jan. '97 
0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
0/(1/7) 
Jan. '98 
0 
none 
0 
0 
Jan. '97 
(abolished) 
Jan. '98 
0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
(0) 
in the initial interim Europe Agrements. 
TABLE C : Overview of access to the EU for industrial products in the EU-Czech and Slovak Interim Europe Agreement 
1. General provisons 
tariffs 
QRs 
March '92 Jan. '93 Jan. '94 Jan. '95 Jan. '96 Jan. '97 Jan. '98 
0 
abolished 
0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
0 
0 
none 
0 
0 
0 
none 
2. Basic products 
Annex IIa - tariffs 
Annex lib - tariffs 
3. Sensitive products (Annex ΠΙ) 
within tariff-quota 
tariffs 
quota-level 
outside Tariff-quota 
tariffs 
QRs 
50 
80 
0 
60 
0 
(40)0 
0 
(20)0 
March '92 
suspended 
120 
March '92 
Jan. '93 
140 
Jan. '93 
July '93 
(140) 150 
Jan. 94 
Jan. '94 
(160) 180 
Jan. '95 
Jan. '95 
abolished 
(1.S0) 
Jan. '96 
Jan. '96 
(200) 
Jan. '97 
Jan. '97 
(abolished) 
Jan. '98 
90 
abolished 
80 
none 
70 
none 
(60)0 
none 
(50)0 
none 
0 
none 
0 
none 
4. ECSC products (Protocol 2) 
Steel tariffs 
QRs 
Coal tariffs 
QRs 
QRs in Annex IV 
80 
abolished 
100 
60 
none 
100 
abolished 
40 
none 
50 
20 
none 
50 
(10)0 
none 
0 
abolished 
0 
none 
0 
0 
none 
0 
5. MFA products (Protocol 1) 
tariffs 
ORs 
5/7 5/7 4/7 2/7 1/7 
unspecified rate of reduction to 0 after (6) 5 years begining 01.01.1994 
0/(1/7) (0) 
Note : The figures presented represent those agreed at the Copenhagen Council. Those in parentheses represent those agreed in the initial interim Europe Agrements. 
Figures with respect to tariffs reflects rates as % of those appi ied prior to the IA. 
Figures with respect to quantitative restrictions (QRs) reflect quotas as % of those applied at begining of IA. 
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TABLE D : Overview of access to the EU for industrial products in the E U -
1. General provisons May '93 
tariffs 0 
QRs none 
Jan. '94 
0 
none 
ftomamia Interim Europe Agreement 
Jan. '95 
0 
none 
Jan. '96 
0 
none 
Jan. '97 
0 
none 
Jan. '98 
0 
none 
2. Basic products 
Annex Ha - tariffs 50 
Annex lib - tariffs 60 
0 
60 
0 
(40)0 
0 
(20)0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3. Sensitive products (Annex III) within tariff-quota 
tariffs suspended 
quota-level 120 
outside tariff-quota 
tariffs 85 
QRs none 
140-50(140) 
70 
none 
180(160) 
55 
none 
abolished 
(180) 
0(40) 
none 
(200) 
(25)0 
none 
(abolished) 
(0) 
none 
4. ECSC products (Protocol 2) 
Steel tariffs 80 
QRs abolished 
Coal tariffs 100 
QRs (except) 
60 
none 
50 
abolished 
QRs in Annex m 
40 
none 
50 
20 
none 
0 
0(10) 
none 
0 
abolished 
0 
none 
0 
none 
5. MFA products (Protocol 1) 
tariffs 5/7 5/7 4/7 2/7 1/7 0(1/7) 
ORs unspecified rate of reduction to 0 after (6) 5 years begining 01.01.1994 
Note : The figures presented represent those agreed at the Copenhagen Council. Those in parentheses represent those 
Figures with respect to tariffs reflects rates as % of those appi ied prior to the IA. 
Figures with respect to quantitative restrictions (QRs) reflect quotas as % of those applied at begining of IA. 
agreed in the initial interim Europe Agrements. 
TABLE E : Overview of access to the EU for industrial products in the EU-Bulgaria Interim Europe Agreement 
1. General provisons Dec. '93 
tariffs 0 
QRs none 
Jan. '94 
0 
none 
Jan. '95 Jan. '96 Jan. 
0 0 
none none 
'97 
0 
none 
Jan. '98 
0 
none 
2. Basic products 
Annex Ha - tariffs 50 
Annex ITb - tariffs 80 
0 
60 
0 0 
(40) 0 (20) 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3. Sensitive products (Annex III) within tariff-quota 
tariffs suspended 
quota-level 120 
outside tariff-quota 
tariffs 85 
QRs none 
140-50 (140) 
70 
none 
abolished 
180(160) (180) 
55 0 (40) 
none none 
(200) 
0(25) 
none 
(abolished) 
0 
none 
4. ECSC products (Protocol 2) 
Steel tariffs 80 
QRs abolished 
Coal tariffs 100 
QRs (except) 
Products in Annex V 
60 
none 
50 
abolished 
40 0 (20) 
none none 
50 0 
10 
none 
0 
abolished 
0 
none 
0 
5. MFA products (Protocol 1) 
tariffs 5/7 5/7 4/7 2/7 1/7 0(1/7) 
ORs unspecified rate of reduction to 0 after (6) 5 years begining 01.01.1994 
Note : The figures presented represent those agreed at the Copenhagen Council. Those in parentheses represent those agreed in the initial interim 
Figures with respect to tariffs reflects rates as % of those appi ied prior to the IA. 
Figures with respect to quantitative restrictions (QRs) reflect quotas as % of those applied at begining of IA. 
Europe Agrements. 
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Principal economie policy measures — June 1994 
Community (EUR-12) 
24.725.6. Corfu European Council endorses economic policy guidelines as 
presented by the ECOFIN Council and, in the context of the White Paper fol­
low-up, agrees a first priority list of eleven major transport projects. 
Belgium 1151 
/., 8., 15., 22., 29.6. The Belgian central bank reduces the discount and inter­
vention rates in five small steps, from 5.3% and 6.7% respectively at the begin­
ning of the month to 4.95% and 6.45% at the end of the month. 
Denmark (DK) 
None. 
Germany (D) 
None. 
Greece (GR) 
31.6. The Bank of Greece increases liquidity by swap operations on foreign 
currencies with commercial banks and by raising the maximum amount of 
banks' borrowing guaranteed by government paper. 
7.6. The Bank of Greece lowers key interest rates as pressures on the 
drachma ease in the first days of June and liquidity increases. Interbank over­
night rate is close to 24% on 7 June, down from 165% on 31 May. 
21.6. The Bank of Greece lowers the overdraft penalty rate from 0.3% to 
0.1%. As from 21 June, the overdraft rate is 33% plus 0.1% per day. 
Spain (Έ) 
3.6. The Government approves a draft law to reorganize the Spanish electri­
cal industry, which aims to simplify the legal rules and to minimise the cost of 
power supply. 
17.6. The Government approves new tax incentives for employment creation. 
Firms which increase their staff in 1994 and maintain new jobs for at least two 
years will be able to apply free depreciation to new fixed assets. 
20.6. The Government approves a new law enlarging the 1993 credit facility 
aimed at supporting medium- and long-term investments of small and me­
dium-sized firms. The new stand-by loan amounts to PTA 200 billion, to be 
implemented through the Official Credit Institute (ICO). 
France (F) 
2.6. The Banque de France cuts its intervention rate from 5.4% to 5.3%. 
3.6. The subsidized interest rate on loans (Prêts Locatifs Intermédiaires) for 
residential construction is cut from 7% to 6.5%. 
7.6. The Aubry Law of January 1993 laying down rules on mass redun­
dancies has been incorporated into the framework of the recent five­year law 
on employment. 
13.6. A number of measures (cashflow facilities) are adopted to support the 
export performance of small and medium­sized enterprises. 
15.6. Tax measures in favour of those selling short­term financial assets 
(SICAV monétaires) to finance construction are extended until the end of 
1994. 
16.6. The Banque de France cuts its intervention rate from 5.3% to 5.2% 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
8.6. The Government announces a package of measures to stimulate em­
ployment and investment: 
­ Industrial, commercial and services companies, with the exception of the 
banking and insurance industry, will be exempted from taxes on 50% of rein­
vested profits. 
­ During the period 1994­96, those employers hiring for an unlimited period 
the long­term unemployed or new entrants to the labour market will benefit 
from a tax rebate of up to 25% of their wage bill (with a maximum threshold of 
LIT 30 million). 
­ During the period 1994­96, the young (below 32 years old), the unem­
ployed, the disabled and people supported by the "wage supplementation 
fund" starting up companies or making new investments in equipment up to 
LIT 300 million will not have to pay the present wide range of taxes on com­
panies. 
­ Small and medium­sized companies which obtain a listing on the stock ex­
change will benefit from a reduction in the corporation tax rate from 36% to 
20%. 
­ Share ownership in companies is encouraged through the introduction of a 
single 12.5% withholding tax on dividends. 
­ Some taxes are abolished and others are simplified in order to reduce the 
current complexity of the Italian tax structure. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None. 
Netherlands (NL) 
6.6. De Nederlandsche Bank reduces its rate on special advances by 0.10 of a 
percentage point to 5%. 
14.6. De Nederlandsche Bank reduces its rate on special advances by 0.10 of 
a percentage point to 4.90%. 
Portugal (P) 
None. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
None. 
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